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Leftist and rightist parties talk to voters in different ways when
inequality is high, but not when inequality is low.
The aftermath of the Great Recessions has seen inequality in the U.S. and other developed
nations increase to unprecedented levels. But how do parties on each side of the ideological
spectrum react to inequality? In new research which examines political parties’ election messages
across 40 democracies, Joshua D. Potter and Margit Tavits find that parties on the left push
economic messages during times of higher inequality, while those on the right tend to focus on
values-based social issues when voters are especially religious or there is significant societal
concern about immigration or ethnic fractionalization. 
For a number of years, scholars have been debating how economically poor, but socially
conservative voters experience politics and are courted by political parties during elections
(notable examples of this inquiry are Thomas Franks’ landmark What’s the Matter with Kansas  as
well as follow on work from Larry M. Bartels). Because these voters are potentially “cross-
pressured” by conflicting socially rightist and economically leftist tendencies, they serve as an
interesting test bed in which scholars can evaluate the electoral effectiveness of leftist and rightist
party messages. The conventional wisdom emerging from the American context is that leftist
parties should pivot toward redistributive economic messages while rightist parties should emphasize social
values issues, such as abortion, religion, and nationalism.
There is very little cross-national work examining this link outside of America, but our recent research shifts the
inquiry into the international realm by examining the messages that hundreds of political parties emphasize during
electoral campaigns in more than 40 democracies. We find that the ways in which parties of the political Left and
Right talk to voters is complicated and heavily mediated by several large scale social factors. That is, it is of
course not the case that leftist parties only emphasize economic issues while rightist parties only emphasize
social issues when it comes to courting the electoral support of cross-pressured voters.
Rather, we find that the level of income inequality in a society fundamentally reshapes the natural electoral
constituencies for the Left and Right and forces these two types of parties into markedly different messaging
strategies. Furthermore, parties of the Right are somewhat constrained by additional factors, such as the extent of
religiosity in the population, the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and immigration levels. Where these
large-scale variables tend toward low levels (or, put differently, when “societal demand” among voters for values-
based representation is low), parties of the Right tend not to make appeals to social values, even when economic
inequality is on the rise.
Why do economic inequality and societal demand have such a dramatic effect on the ways in which parties
represent their policies to voters? We argue that leftist parties emphasize economic issues in their campaigns
when inequality is high, while rightist parties do not. This is because inequality creates large swathes of relatively
poorer voters in the electorate and — due to the fact that leftist parties espouse redistributive economic policies —
this increases the size of the Left’s voting constituency. Around the world, when inequality increases, parties of the
Left systematically shift their representational efforts toward economic issues because these are winning issues
for the Left.
By contrast, we argue theoretically and find empirically that rightist parties are systematically unlikely to
emphasize economic issues when inequality is high. This is due to the fact that their pro-market economic
orientations fail to resonate with relatively poorer and potentially cross-pressured voters who would benefit from
government-directed redistribution. Rather, we would expect parties of the Right to pivot toward more socially-
grounded, values-based issues. Figure 1 below illustrates a summary of our empirical results. Points to the right of
0 indicate that increasing inequality increases that type of rhetoric in party election platforms; points to the left
indicate that increasing inequality decreases that type of rhetoric. Confidence intervals — or measures of
statistical uncertainty — surround precise point estimates of the effect derived from our regressions.
Figure 1 – The impact of increasing economic inequality on the types of statements in leftist (blue) and
rightist (green) parties’ election platforms. 
The graphic indicates that across hundreds of
Leftist parties from around the world
(depicted in blue in Figure 1), as economic
inequality increases, these parties increase
the amount of time they spend talking about
economic interests (in general) and pro-state
economic intervention (in particular). By
contrast, across hundreds of Rightist parties
from around the world, a commensurate
increase in inequality does not prompt a
similar emphasis on economic interests, but
does elicit much more emphasis on values-
based social issues (in general) and on
values traditionally associated with the Right
(such as nationalism), but not values
associated with the Left (such as
multiculturalism).
But we also uncover another fascinating
relationship: parties of the Right are more
likely to pivot toward more social, values-
based issues only when inequality is high and
societal demand for values-based
representation is high. Specifically, we find that when immigration rates are high or when voters are especially
religious or when there is substantial ethnic fractionalization within society, then rightist parties have an
alternative, non-economic narrative to emphasize with voters. These variables are indicators of what we call
“societal demand” for values-based representation and, where they exist, parties of the Right have an opportunity
to cross-pressure poorer voters.
In Figure 2 below, we bundle together our indicators of societal demand into one aggregated variable that ranges
from -4 to +4, where more positive numbers indicate a society that has some combination of highly religious
voters, high immigration rates, or high levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. We run regression models only on
right-leaning political parties to explore the effect of increasing economic inequality conditional on levels of
societal demand. Where the blue line slopes upward and its confidence intervals are bounded away from the 0
line, we recover a statistically discernible difference. That is, it is only at higher levels of societal demand that
increasing economic inequality systematically pushes parties of the Right to emphasize values-based rhetoric in
their election platforms.
Figure 2 – The impact of increasing economic inequality on the types of statements in rightist parties’
election platforms conditional of the level of societal demand. 
The implications of our findings are relatively straightforward. Parties of the Left almost always possess incentives
to cater to voters’ economic needs during times of high economic inequality. We see this logic borne out
repeatedly around the world; for example, left-learning parties in Germany, Sweden, and the Czech Republic have
all exhibited an historical trend toward greater emphasis on economic interests in their platforms during periods of
high inequality. When inequality lessens, these same parties retreat from economic emphasis and spend more
time talking about a broader set of issues.
The story for the Right is somewhat more complicated. Across the world, rightist parties vary significantly in the
tone and timbre of their campaigns. In more homogeneous and secular countries (such as Denmark or Germany),
the main rightwing parties are socially liberal and focus mostly on economic issues. However, in more diverse and
religious societies (such as Switzerland or Poland or, increasingly, the United Kingdom), they are socially
conservative with a focus on traditional moral values or nationalism.
Featured image: amy (Flickr, CC-BY-NC-2.0)
This article is based on the paper, ‘The Effect of Inequality and Social Identity on Party Strategies’ , in the American
Journal of Political Science.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.           
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USApp– American Politics and Policy.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1VPGaEG 
 _________________________________ 
About the authors 
Joshua D. Potter – Louisiana State University
Joshua D. Potter is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University. His
research interests include campaign finance, party systems, and electoral politics; his work in
these areas has been published in the American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of
Political Science, and Journal of Politics, among others.
Margit Tavits – Washington University in St. Louis
Margit Tavits is Professor of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis. Her work has
appeared in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, and
Journal of Politics, among others, and her most recent book, Post-Communist Democracies and
Party Organization, was recently published by Cambridge University Press.
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 2014 LSE USAPP
